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MOORE’S POTENTIAL
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn**
INTRODUCTION
Underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland1 are long-term changes in the relationship between the family and
the state. These changes upended the reciprocities between the state
definition of legitimate families and the basis for claims of state recognition
and support. Today, in contrast, many view the determination of what
constitutes a family as a matter of personal self-definition to which the state
should defer, producing even greater division in the relationship between
families—however they are defined—and claims to state support.
These issues have become the subject of an intense culture war.2 On the
one hand, conservatives continue to view married, gendered, two-parent
families as essential to societal well-being; thus, they favor traditional family
values in the public square and the provision of state support to families only
in the context of shared community values.3 Liberals, in contrast, emphasize
tolerance in the public square and promote greater state support for all
children regardless of family structure, viewing it as necessary to realizing
the promises of equality and participatory citizenship in a democracy.4
The Supreme Court decided Moore before the modern cultural divide on
the structure of the family fully took hold; thus, Moore’s various opinions do
* Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota. We thank Clare
Huntington, Robin Lenhardt, and all of the participants at the Fordham Law Review Family
Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at Fordham University School of Law. For an
overview of the symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword: Moore
Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017).
** Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1 (2010).
3. Scholars term this system, which treats gendered, two-parent marriages as critical to
children’s support, as the privatization of dependency. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 161–62 (1995).
4. See June Carbone, “Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin’s Soul,
Self, and Society: The New Morality and the Modern State, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (Aug. 25,
2016) (reviewing EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE NEW MORALITY AND THE
MODERN
STATE
(2015)),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsi.12223/full
[https://perma.cc/7AUL-SC6J].

101

CARBONE & CAHN FORDHAM FOR SSRNDOCUMENT1

102

3/28/20173/27/20173/26/17 12:11 PM12:12 PM7:18 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

not directly address this culture divide. Yet, in two critical parts of the
decision, the Court seemed to have anticipated this culture conflict,
foreshadowing the tension between the growing desire of individuals to
define “family” in terms of their own choosing and the state’s power to define
what constitutes a legitimate family form and, thus, to decide who is entitled
to state support.
First, in granting Inez Moore a constitutional right to live with a family
that included both of her grandchildren, the plurality based its decision on
tradition, not autonomy.5 At the time, judicial conservatives had not yet
hijacked tradition as support for constitutional originalism and judicial
liberals had not yet unequivocally embraced individual choice as a source of
protection for alternative families. Thus, Moore is a methodologically
conservative opinion that celebrates the traditional institution of the family
through the vehicle of a grandmother-headed extended family. In this sense,
Moore has much in common with Obergefell v. Hodges,6 which reconciled
an alternative family with mainstream institutions.7
Second, while embracing Moore’s extended family as part of a
longstanding tradition, Moore only narrowly accords recognition to the
“traditional family” in this extended family form as entitled to constitutional
protection.8 Instead, the various opinions saw this particular family structure
as a fallback option that served as a privatized form of insurance to provide
for children in times of financial or other family stress.9 Notably, none of the
opinions discuss the circumstances that led to the grandchildren’s residence
with their grandmother, other than noting the death of one of the children’s
mothers.10 Rather, the case honors a worthy individual—a grandmother who
takes in her multiple grandchildren—without fully exploring the relationship
between family and economic well-being in the changing American
landscape. Thus, while crafting an opinion that does not challenge the
deference due to land use decisions, the Justices also avoided laying a
foundation for alternative families to claim state support in either practical or
doctrinal terms.
At the time of the decision, single-family zoning restrictions, which might
not have been controversial in other eras, were emerging as markers of race
and class and were facing mounting legal challenges.11 Today, studies
indicate that racially and economically integrated communities tend to
enhance the well-being and achievement of poor families without

5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504–06.
6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
7. Id. at 2595–96.
8. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05.
9. See id. at 505.
10. Id. at 496–97.
11. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975).
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undermining those who are better off.12 Yet, local zoning laws, particularly
when tied to family characteristics, tend to encourage racial and financial
segregation, compounding the disadvantages of poor communities of color.13
In particular, these laws give every community an incentive to adopt zoning
restrictions that attract stable, higher-income families and exclude those
likely to be poorer, needier, and a drain on community desirability or
resources.14 In the face of the widespread adoption of such exclusionary
practices, communities that adopt broader definitions of acceptable
households may find themselves at a disadvantage in sustaining an
appropriate mix of households. Thus, East Cleveland, a heavily AfricanAmerican community struggling to maintain its middle-class status, adopted
the zoning laws at issue in Moore in an effort to stave off a downward cycle
in the community’s fortunes.15 The opinions in Moore, however, never
acknowledged this community dynamic at work.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the culture wars that have consumed
American politics since Moore. Part II discusses Moore’s uneasy position
within the conception of family as a matter of choice versus tradition. Then,
to the extent that the Moore Court addressed the changing family, Part III
shows how it did so by treating the extended family as a manifestation of
traditional family values, not the newly emerging substantive family values
that valorize delay in childbearing and financial independence.16 Finally,
Part IV considers Moore’s missed opportunities to examine the relationship
between family form, race, and class.
I. CULTURE WARS REVISITED
Scholars routinely describe American politics—and the disputes about
family values—as a culture war.17 While there is no popularly accepted
definition of what that culture war is about, it certainly includes differences
about the source of moral values,18 the increasing ideological identification
12. See, e.g., Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on
Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates 73
(2015),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/nbhds_paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UC44-8XCQ].
13. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Are the Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265
(1997).
14. See id. at 2269 (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE,
AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996), and DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND
THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)) (describing the social and economic incentives for
exclusionary zoning as “the political independence of suburban jurisdictions, the nearcomplete delegation of zoning power by the state to the locality, the reliance on local taxes to
fund local government services (particularly education), and national policies facilitating and
subsidizing suburban development on a scale never undertaken before”).
15. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 389.
16. The authors term this distinction as red versus blue family values. See generally CAHN
& CARBONE, supra note 2.
17. See infra notes 18–22.
18. See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE NEW MORALITY AND
THE MODERN STATE (2015).
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of American political parties,19 deeply rooted personality differences in
values orientation,20 differences in forms of expression,21 and the role of the
family in civic life.22
However the culture wars are defined, the family has been a central part of
that dispute, which can be described as a clash between “red” versus “blue”
family values—or, more generally, as part of a traditionalist versus modernist
cultural divide. At the core of the divide are two different worldviews with
overlapping political and family consequences. The blue system combines
“public tolerance with private discipline.”23 In this modernist system, people
choose individually crafted values, central to self-definition and personal
self-worth.24 In contrast, the red system advocates public orthodoxy and
private forgiveness.25 In this traditionalist system, values must be externally
derived—from God, from authority grounded in tradition, or from human
nature—to have meaning, and they should accordingly be upheld in the
public square.26 Repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation with the
community occur in private.27
The differences between these two systems have implications for both
legal justifications and content. Blue legal justifications uphold individual
choice; red justifications look to sources of value outside the individual, such
as tradition, authority, or community consensus.28 In terms of content, blue
analysis favors a functional approach that looks at the importance of family
roles, while red analysis favors time-honored definitions of family
regularity.29 Thus, blue analysis is less tied to either continuity or
institutional regularity.30
Using these differing approaches, one can evaluate the family
transformations in the latter part of the twentieth century. Values about
family form changed from a uniform emphasis on the necessity of
heterosexual marriage (i.e., the traditionalist red system) to the acceptability

19. See John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 654
(2006).
20. See DONALD BRAMAN ET AL., CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH., THE
SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY: MAKING SENSE OF—AND PROGRESS IN—THE
AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 16 (2007).
21. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE 1–29 (2014); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK 143–52 (2d ed. 2002).
22. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2.
23. See id. at 3–4.
24. See id. at 44.
25. See Carbone, supra note 4, at 4–5.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 16.
28. See id. at 2 n.1.
29. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 6–7.
30. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (plurality opinion)
(accepting changes over time in the meaning of marriage), with id. at 2612–16 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (treating marriage as an unchanging, time-honored system).
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of alternative family forms (i.e., the modernist blue system).31 At the same
time, the pathways into the middle class changed from shepherding couples
into early marriages to encouraging lengthy delays in family formation that
better prepared parents for the responsibilities of family life.32 The process
of transformation and the conflicts between the two systems exacerbate racial
and class differences33 and frame the perspectives that underlie Moore.
II. CHOICE VERSUS TRADITION AS A SOURCE OF VALUES
The facts of Moore are straightforward. Sixty-three-year-old Inez Moore
shared her home with her adult son, Dale Sr., and her two young
grandchildren, Dale Jr. and John Jr.34 Six years after John Jr. came to live
with his grandmother following his mother’s death, the City of East
Cleveland prosecuted Moore for violating the city’s single-family zoning
ordinance.35 The Ohio state courts upheld the conviction, but the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in what should have been a
relatively easy decision, given the harshness of the impact on a sympathetic
grandmother.36 Nonetheless, the result sharply divided the Court and
obscured the case’s broader significance for the legal recognition of families
and for the interactions among race, class, and family orthodoxy.
The Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional on its face but
only by a vote of five to four and with disagreement among the five Justices
in the majority on the basis for doing so. In total, the Justices filed six
separate opinions. This part focuses on three of those opinions: (1) Justice
John Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion, (2) Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality
opinion, and (3) Justice Potter Stewart’s dissenting opinion.
A. Justice Stevens’s Concurrence
Writing only for himself, Justice Stevens issued the most far-reaching
opinion, concurring only in the judgment.37 While his concurrence is viewed
as idiosyncratic, Stevens may well have anticipated later judicial
developments in his desire to avoid a publicly imposed definition of family.
Unlike any of the other Justices, Stevens described the case as one that started
with Moore’s choice of how to constitute her family. He thus framed the
case in terms of the arbitrariness of the ordinance, observing that the “city
31. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 33–46.
32. See id.
33. See generally id.
34. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977).
35. Id. at 497. John Jr., who was ten years old by the time the Supreme Court decided the
case, had lived with his grandmother since his mother died when he was less than a year old,
and his father, John Sr., apparently lived with the family as well. Id. at 497 n.4; see Brief for
Appellant at 4, Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178722, at *4.
36. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he zoning power is not a
license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply
into private areas of protected family life.”).
37. See id. at 513–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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has failed totally to explain the need for a rule that would allow a homeowner
to have two grandchildren live with her if they are brothers but not if they are
cousins.”38 In emphasizing Moore’s ability to choose her family form,
however, Stevens faced a dilemma: if Moore could define family in whatever
terms she chooses, it would be hard to associate her particular definition of
family with constitutional protection. Stevens skirted this issue by according
Moore constitutional protection as a homeowner, rather than on the basis of
her family form.39 Stevens wrote that Moore’s interest in her ability to live
with both grandsons was particularly important with respect to a rule that cuts
“deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of
residential property—that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her
property.”40
Stevens’s decision not to define the “family” that is entitled to
constitutional protection encouraged him to take on an issue the other Justices
in the majority wished to avoid: the standard of deference due to state zoning
decisions.41 The Moore dissent, much like the Supreme Court’s 1974
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 accorded such ordinances
substantial deference, requiring only a rational relationship to a permissible
state objective.43 In contrast, Stevens wrote that, because the ordinance
ha[d] not been shown to have any “substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare” of the city of East Cleveland, and . . . it
must fall under [this Court’s] limited standard of review of zoning
decisions[,] . . . East Cleveland’s unprecedented ordinance constitutes a
taking of property without due process and without just compensation. 44

Such a standard—requiring a showing of a “substantial” rather than a
“rational” relationship between a zoning regulation and public policy
concerns—would have substantially increased the scrutiny applicable to local
zoning ordinances that infringed on property owners’ associational rights.
By tying his decision to the Takings Clause of the Constitution, Stevens did
not depend on a particular construction of the constitutional rights accorded
families. Instead, Stevens emphasized that the state had a legitimate interest
in regulating “the identity, as opposed to the number, of persons who may
compose a household only to the extent that the ordinances require such
households to remain nontransient, single-housekeeping units.”45 Had his
opinion been the majority, it would have provided the basis for challenging
restrictive zoning provisions throughout the country, in effect limiting,
though not necessarily overturning, the Court’s decision in Belle Terre,
which upheld a similar single family zoning restriction as it applied to
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 519–21.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Moore, 431 U.S. at 538–39 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 519.
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unrelated individuals.46 The ordinance in Belle Terre appeared to be aimed
primarily at restricting the number of college students in the area;47 it would
not have prevented Moore from living with her grandsons.48
B. Justice Powell’s Plurality Opinion
In contrast, Justice Powell, joined by three other Justices, wrote a plurality
opinion emphasizing the constitutional protection afforded families49 and
grounding the definition of “families” in tradition.50 In subjecting the East
Cleveland ordinance to greater scrutiny than that associated with a rational
relationship test, the plurality shifted its emphasis away from property rights,
where it viewed a rational relationship test as appropriate, and toward the
intrusion on family.51 The Court observed that East Cleveland “has chosen
to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family
itself,”52 making it “a crime of a grandmother’s choice to live with her
grandson in circumstances like those presented” in the case.53 The plurality
opinion thus based its analysis on the Due Process Clause, holding that the
“Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”54 In turn, this analysis required the
Court to provide a definition of the family to be accorded constitutional
protection; the plurality adopted a conservative definition.55
In articulating a notion of the family that justified constitutional protection,
the plurality looked to tradition and observed that the extended family was at
least as deeply rooted in tradition as the nuclear family, if not more so.56 The
nuclear family, in contrast, was a recent development.57 The plurality then
noted that “[e]ven if conditions of modern society have brought about a
decline in extended family households,”58 it remains true that “[t]he tradition
of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recognition.”59 The opinion found this tradition
in “the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and
honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1.
See id.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 n.15.
See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 35.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 498–500.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)).
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504.
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family.”60 The Justices thus treated as commonplace the recognition of
extended relatives as family and viewed the grandmother’s actions in taking
in both of her grandchildren as admirable. In doing so, the plurality adopted
a normative vision of the family entitled to constitutional protection—a
fundamentally different approach from Stevens’s modernist embrace of
choice. Accordingly, the Court acknowledged that affording constitutional
protection to families required providing a substantive definition of what
constituted a family.61 Moreover, the plurality did not question the ability of
governmental authorities to define what they meant by family; the opinion
simply required that the definition accept families determined by blood,
adoption, and marriage.
C. Justice Stewart’s Dissent
Justice Stewart’s dissent, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, sought both
to narrow the definition of the family and to limit the constitutional protection
accorded to such families.62 In doing so, it turned the plurality’s emphasis of
the result’s arbitrariness on its head. Stewart wrote that the
interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen
and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not
rise [to the level of a constitutionally protected interest]. To equate this
interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear and raise
children is to extend the limited substantive contours of the Due Process
Clause beyond recognition.63

Stewart’s belittling comments, which assumed that Moore could simply have
some of the family live in the other dwelling unit she owned in the same
building,64 suggested that Stevens’s associational interests were not worthy
of constitutional protection and that Moore’s choices about which relatives
to invite into her residence had nothing to do with the definition of a
constitutionally protected family.65 In short, the Constitution did not protect
“choice” in the modernist sense at all.
A fuller embrace of the idea of choice would come decades in the future.
Consider, as a point in contrast, Justice Kennedy’s opening paragraph in
Lawrence v. Texas,66 which struck down a statute criminalizing same-sex
sodomy. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves

60. Id. at 505. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, Moore and Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), are based on similar views of how to find the traditions
protected by the Due Process Clause.
61. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05.
62. Id. at 531–41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 537.
64. Id. at 533 & n.4.
65. Id. at 537.
66. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.67

Justice Stevens’s concurrence would be as close as the Moore Court would
come to the modernist embrace of an individual right of self-definition.68
III. MOORE AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY
FAMILY TRANSFORMATION
The Moore opinion, in addition to its refusal to embrace the rhetoric of
family choice, also skirted the substantive family transformation that was
taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century. That transformation
involved a shift from marriage as part of a universal transition from
adolescence into adulthood to family formation as a choice best made by
those who have attained emotional maturity and financial independence.69
The change required an embrace of contraception and, if necessary, abortion
as critical to the postponement of childbearing, greater acceptance of
nonmarital sexuality, and the redefinition of what had been gendered family
roles.70
Moore could have been cast in such terms. Doing so, however, would have
required shifting the focus from the grandmother, who is sympathetic under
any definition of family values, to her two sons, the fathers of her
grandchildren. We know relatively little about the sons. We know that the
first son, Dale Sr., and his child, Dale Jr., were living with Moore before the
case arose.71 Only when the second grandson, John Jr., joined the household
did the family violate the East Cleveland ordinance.72 John Jr. came to live
with Moore when his mother died.73 The opinion, however, tells us nothing
about the circumstances. These issues are irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Moore—the Court addressed only the application of the East
Cleveland ordinance to the grandmother’s decision to live with both of her
grandchildren.
Instead, Moore ties the extended family to a tradition that privatizes family
support. Moore is a homeowner, and there was no indication that she
received public benefits to care for her grandchildren. When her sons needed
assistance with the care of their children, whether because of John Jr.’s
mother’s death or their own financial needs, they turned to a family
member—not the state—for assistance. These factors make Moore part of a
67. Id. at 562.
68. The question of whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced a modernist definition
of family formation as a matter of individual expression is complex. For critiques of
Lawrence, which unmoors its analysis from blood, marriage, and adoptions but still relies on
traditionalist tropes of what an intimate relationship constitutes, see Katherine M. Franke, The
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
69. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 20–22.
70. Id. at 19–46.
71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 533 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 496–97 (plurality opinion).
73. Id.
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long-standing tradition of neoliberal family support, and the Justices who join
in the plurality opinion championing Moore’s position do so in precisely
these terms.
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, had grounded constitutional
protection of the family in its deep roots “in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”74 He acknowledged that extended families had become less likely
to live together but emphasized that they still came together in times of
need.75 He treated the extended family as a fallback option, a form of
insurance policy designed to protect the children from the failings of their
parents. This reasoning thus broke little new ground in the definition of the
family.
Justice William Brennan filed a concurrence, together with Justice
Thurgood Marshall, that went further than the plurality in acknowledging the
roots of family diversity. The concurrence agreed with the plurality that the
ordinance impermissibly infringed upon Moore’s choice of what constituted
family and that the plurality’s acceptance of the extended family by blood
had deeply embedded roots.76 Brennan, however, emphasized that the East
Cleveland ordinance displayed “a depressing insensitivity toward the
economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society.”77
Brennan’s concurrence linked the extended family to generations of
immigrant families and to class and racial differences, noting:
Even in husband and wife households, 13% of black families compared
with 3% of white families include relatives under 18 years old, in addition
to the couple’s own children. In black households whose head is an elderly
woman, as in this case, the contrast is even more striking: 48% of such
black households, compared with 10% of counterpart white households,
include related minor children not offspring of the head of the household.78

The concurrence thus saw the East Cleveland ordinance as arbitrarily
refusing to recognize not only a long-established family form but also a
family form associated with poor and minority families and of continuing
importance to those experiencing financial stress.79 In short, the extended
74. Id. at 503.
75. Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 508.
78. Id. at 509–10; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 12.
79. Indeed, Brennan’s concurrence, which went further than the other opinions in
endorsing the benefits of extended families, also saw extended families as a consequence of
economic stress, observing:
The “extended family” that provided generations of early Americans with social
services and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the
beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities, remains
not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic
necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers of
the poor and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled pooling of
scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household.
Id. at 508.
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family is a consequence of compulsion rather than choice, and the conclusion
of both the plurality opinion and the concurrence is that the ordinance is
arbitrary, if not counterproductive. The plurality, by grounding its analysis
in tradition, could accordingly strike it down without influencing either the
likely course of family evolution or the patterns of racial and economic
segregation that affect American cities.
The four dissenting Justices also faced a dilemma. They, too, should have
viewed Moore approvingly. Yet, they wanted to preserve the ability of
zoning boards to reinforce the links between property values and mainstream
families, however the particular community defined them. They therefore
did not want to address the definition of family at all.80 These opinions, while
sharing Stevens’s determination not to embed a definition of family in the
Constitution, disagreed with his expansion of the constitutional rights of
homeowners vis-à-vis the state and thus sought ways to allow the Court to
look the other way.81
The multiple opinions in Moore, while disagreeing sharply with each other
in the framing of the issues and in their conclusions about the result, do not
challenge the definition of what constitutes a family nor the ability of zoning
authorities to define families and to channel82 appropriate residential
behavior. To the extent any of the opinions extended constitutional
protection to families, they did so on the basis of blood ties rather than
choice.83 The four Justices who joined the plurality opinion grounded their
conclusion not only in tradition but also in the practicalities of a private
system of family support.84 A grandmother who comes to the aid of her
grandchildren, after all, vindicates both traditionalist and modernist family
values. Although Moore breaks new ground in protecting a grandmother
from the vagaries of a local zoning ordinance, it does not fundamentally
change the understandings of what constitutes a family—nor do much to
restrict exclusionary zoning laws.

80. Id. at 521–22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right solution was for
Moore to seek a variance from the local zoning officials).
81. See, e.g., id. at 550–51 (White, J., dissenting) (adopting a deferential standard of
review toward zoning ordinances). In fact, many states have dealt with exclusionary zoning
provisions in exactly this way, keeping such restrictions on the books and then backing down
only in the face of determined (or embarrassing) opposition. Such challenges, though, may be
beyond the reach of financially stressed extended families. See Kent W. Bartholomew,
Comment, The Definition of “Family” in Missouri Local Zoning Ordinances: An Analysis of
the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 665–66 (2008).
82. See generally June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family
Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (2011); Linda C. McClain,
Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
83. In this sense, Stevens’s opinion grounds its protection of Moore on her rights as a
homeowner, not on a right extended to families per se. See supra Part II.A.
84. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion).
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY, CLASS, AND RACE:
THE UNFINISHED DISCUSSION
Moore is indubitably about the intersection of family, class, and race.
Brennan’s concurrence observed that the nuclear family is a pattern
associated with “white suburbia”85 and stressed that the “Constitution cannot
be interpreted . . . to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of
us of white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.”86 It
documented the dramatically greater association of extended families in
African-American communities than in white communities. It also
commented that this may reflect “the truism that black citizens, like
generations of white immigrants before them, have been victims of economic
and other disadvantages that would worsen if they were compelled to
abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”87
None of the opinions acknowledge, however, the role of the changing
family in exacerbating race and class disparities. The plurality celebrated the
traditional extended family without noting its association with marriage.88 In
some communities, extended families permitted earlier marriages, with the
new bride and groom moving in with their parents, or they contributed to the
ability of working-class mothers to work outside the home or to care for
elderly or disabled relatives. And they have long served as the fallback
helping to deal with the consequences of death or divorce.89
By the late 1970s, however, extended families were also dealing with a
national decline in marriage.90 Both better-off and poorer women had
become more sexually active, and the importance of the shotgun marriage
was decreasing for both.91 Ambitious women responded by embracing
contraception and abortion, while working class women became more likely
to give birth without marrying. Extended families, especially in AfricanAmerican communities, were associated with “matrifocal families.”92
This created a dilemma for zoning boards. East Cleveland was a
predominately African-American community, with an African-American
city manager and city commission.93 Robert Burt observed that “the purpose
of the ordinance was quite straightforward: to exclude from a middle-class,
predominantly black community, that saw itself as socially and economically
upwardly mobile, other black families most characteristic of lower-class
ghetto life.”94 This purpose does not make sense if extended families simply
85. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 509.
88. Id. at 503–06 (plurality opinion).
89. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY
LAW (2000).
90. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 19–32.
91. Id. at 34–37.
92. Burt, supra note 15, at 388.
93. Moore, 431 U.S. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. Burt, supra note 15, at 389.
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served as fallback options for nuclear families experiencing hardships, such
as the death of a child’s mother. Instead, Burt emphasized that the problem
with these extended families was not so much that they were
multigenerational but that they were female headed and “disproportionately
characteristic of black lower-income households.”95
By adopting this ordinance, East Cleveland thus sought to preserve its
middle-class character, not its racial character. Moore may also have been
trying to preserve her family’s middle-class status by including her
grandchildren in the home she owned in a better part of town than may have
been available to her sons if they sought to live with their children on their
own. Justice Stewart dismisses the importance of Moore’s interest in living
in East Cleveland, describing the city as “an area with a radius of three miles
and a population of 40,000” and suggesting that Moore could move with her
grandchildren to some other part of town.96 Yet, none of the opinions tell us
how easy that would have been, given the racial composition of the rest of
the area, or how easy it would have been for Moore to sell her home or find
a similar house she could afford elsewhere. Moreover, moving would have
almost certainly been disruptive for her and her grandchildren.97
The fundamental socioeconomic question underlying the case involves the
role of economic and racial segregation in limiting social mobility and
compounding the effects that may be associated with family form. Modern
research indicates that, holding constant for other factors, some communities
promote social mobility better than others.98 The communities that provide
the greatest advantages have “lower rates of residential segregation by
income and race, lower levels of income inequality, better schools, lower
rates of violent crime, and a larger share of two-parent households.”99
Moreover, children who move from less-advantaged to more-advantaged
communities enjoy significant advantages even if their parents remain poor
and they continue to live in single-parent families.100 Ironically, therefore,
Moore had strong interests—to preserve the value of the property she owned
and to provide a decent life for her grandchildren—in living in an area with
more nuclear family households. And East Cleveland, in turn, best served
Moore’s interests by allowing her to remain without (again, ironically)
attracting many more families like hers.101
Given these realities, neither the Supreme Court nor the City of East
Cleveland nor Moore had any good options in addressing this issue, and none
95. Id. at 388.
96. Moore, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
97. See William G. Austin, Relocation, Research, and Forensic Evaluation, Part I:
Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 137, 140 (2008)
(demonstrating the harmful effects of residential mobility on children).
98. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2.
99. CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12, at 7.
100. Id.
101. This is true so long as extended families in fact serve the role, as described in Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion, of providing a privatized way of dealing with family stress.
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of the Moore opinions discuss the community effects underlying the case.
The dissent wished to affirm the validity of local zoning laws without
acknowledging the role such ordinances play in promoting racial and
economic segregation. The plurality wished to affirm the legitimacy of
extended family households without acknowledging that a concentration of
single-parent families tends to undermine community well-being.102 Justice
Stevens, in giving homeowners a right to association without tying it to
constitutional protection for families, penned the most radically
individualistic opinion, elevating property rights over community efforts to
enhance property values. Yet, it seems closer in spirit to objections to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain103 than to cases like Lawrence that
grant a right of intimate association. Considered in retrospect, Moore stands
as a common sense invalidation of an arbitrary definition of single family
applied to produce unsupportable results in the case of a sympathetic
grandmother. It has not contributed, however, to any greater appreciation of
how the constitution of families104 interacts with the constitution of
communities to determine societal well-being.
CONCLUSION
In the years after Moore, the cultural, racial, and economic divisions
centered on the family have increased. A large number of states have struck
down restrictive zoning measures based on family form, while a significant
number of other states have refused to do so.105 In 1979, less-traditional
families were still largely associated with race; today, they have increasingly
also become a marker of class as poor and working-class white families have
adopted some of the same practices.106 A number of states, such as
California, override local zoning laws to ensure that all communities include
affordable housing, while other states have allowed racial and economic
segregation to become more entrenched.107
Today, as much as in 1979, there is no agreement about whether the
relationship between the constitution of family and the constitution of
community should involve a red embrace of established values in the public

102. This may be true for many reasons, including their association with poverty.
103. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
104. See Burt, supra note 15.
105. See Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home Ordinances: Judicial
Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447,
454 (1999).
106. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING
APART (2012).
107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 (West 2017) (requiring localities to meet
their “fair share” of the need for housing at all income levels, specifically including the need
for very low-, low-, and moderate-income housing); CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12
(ranking municipalities in terms of their opportunities for social mobility).

CARBONE & CAHN FORDHAM FOR SSRNDOCUMENT1

2017]

3/28/20173/27/20173/26/17 12:11 PM12:12 PM7:18 PM

MOORE’S POTENTIAL

115

square or a blue celebration of individual choice coupled with the
construction of communities designed to support all of our children.

